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A B S T R A C T
The ﬁfth section of our Special Task Force report identiﬁes and
discusses two aggregation issues: 1) aggregation of cost and beneﬁt
information across individuals to a population level for beneﬁt plan
decision making and 2) combining multiple elements of value into a
single value metric for individuals. First, we argue that additional
elements could be included in measures of value, but such elements
have not generally been included in measures of quality-adjusted life-
years. For example, we describe a recently developed extended cost-
effectiveness analysis (ECEA) that provides a good example of how to
use a broader concept of utility. ECEA adds two features—measures of
ﬁnancial risk protection and income distributional consequences. We
then discuss a further option for expanding this approach—aug-
mented CEA, which can introduce many value measures. Neither of
these approaches, however, provide a comprehensive measure of
value. To resolve this issue, we review a technique called multicriteria
decision analysis that can provide a comprehensive measure of value.
We then discuss budget-setting and prioritization using multicriteria
decision analysis, issues not yet fully resolved. Next, we discuss
deliberative processes, which represent another important approach
for population- or plan-level decisions used by many health technol-
ogy assessment bodies. These use quantitative information on CEA
and other elements, but the group decisions are reached by a
deliberative voting process. Finally, we brieﬂy discuss the use of
stated preference methods for developing “hedonic” value frame-
works, and conclude with some recommendations in this area.
Keywords: aggregation, cost-effectiveness, equity, multi-dimensioned
beneﬁts.
Copyright & 2018, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.
Introduction
This section identiﬁes and discusses two types of aggregation
issues. One arises from the aggregation of cost and beneﬁt
information across individuals to a population level for beneﬁt
plan decision making. The other deals with the combination of
multiple elements of value into a single value metric for individ-
uals. We assess both issues here.
Regarding the ﬁrst, cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and
(more broadly) cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA) share common origins
and common deﬁcits. Because they originate in utility max-
imization for a single individual, they cannot accommodate
societal issues that involve (among other things) the distribution
of costs and beneﬁts across a population. For example, the US
1939 Flood Control Act speciﬁed that water projects could be
undertaken only when “the beneﬁts, to whomever they accrue, [be]
in excess of the estimated costs.” These “distributional issues”
remain outside the domain of traditional CEA and CBA. Thus, the
problem is how best to aggregate the beneﬁts enjoyed and the
costs borne by individuals into a societal statement of value.
Bator [1] proposes (in effect) a benign dictator whose utility
function includes the utilities of individuals in the population,
allowing different weights for different people, but this is seldom
if ever operationalized meaningfully.
Even the question of “distribution” can have multiple mean-
ings. For example, regarding the health of different groups in a
population, does “equity” mean equal access to health care or
does it mean equal health outcomes? The latter approach implies
a greater emphasis on caring for population subgroups with poor
health status than does the former. These different meanings of
equity have different implications for the way one might priori-
tize various health interventions.
The second class of aggregation issues appears when the
deﬁnition of value has more than a single element or dimension.
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CEA and CBA each have a single metric of value—cost per
quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) (or some similar measure of
health beneﬁt such as disability-adjusted life-year [DALY] or
others) or net monetary value (in CBA). Some people object to
having the analyst monetize health beneﬁts as required by CBA,
and hence prefer CEA. When multiple dimensions of value arise,
CBA and CEA have no way to formally incorporate them (except,
in CBA, by monetizing them when feasible). Thus, this raises the
issue of aggregation across value components.
In the article by Garrison et al. [2], we described a number of
decision contexts and perspectives potentially relevant to con-
sidering and estimating value in a microeconomic framework.
The two types of aggregation issues are then related in that the
aggregation of elements of value at the individual level becomes
a necessary input for the aggregation at the population level. As
mentioned, most CEAs—at least those assessing new biophar-
maceutical products—have been oriented to the normative ques-
tion of whether a health plan should adopt a new technology.
Thus, they can be an important element in health technology
assessment (HTA), which often considers a broader range of
components or issues.
We discuss these issues here, organizing this section as
follows. In the ﬁrst section, we argue that additional elements
could be included in measures of value, but such elements have
not generally been included in measures of QALYs. As a speciﬁc
example, in the second section we describe a recently developed
methodology called “extended” CEA (ECEA) that provides a good
example of how to use a broader concept of utility, which has
been applied to some speciﬁc interventions. ECEA adds two
features—the element of ﬁnancial risk protection (one part of
insurance value assessed in the article by Garrison et al. [2]) and
income distributional consequences. The third section discusses
further options for expanding this approach (what we call
“augmented” CEA [ACEA]). In the fourth section we discuss
another, even broader approach called multicriteria decision
analysis (MCDA) that has some intuitive appeal, especially for
decision makers who consider other elements or components not
easily measured in CEA or CBA. This approach requires that
decision makers place quantitative weights on the various
criteria, depending on their relative importance for a decision.
This exercise can make group decision making more transparent.
The ﬁfth section discusses budget-setting and prioritization in
these frameworks, building upon the previous discussion in the
article by Danzon et al. [3] discussing the situation in which
budget allocations and decision-making cutoffs are not perfectly
aligned. The sixth section discusses deliberative processes that
represent another important approach for population- or plan-
level decisions that is used by many HTA bodies. It uses
quantitative information on CEA and other elements, but in the
end, the group decision is reached by a deliberative voting
process. This section also includes a brief discussion of alter-
native voting methods that deliberative bodies might use.
Additional Value Elements: Conceptually Appealing
but Currently Impractical to Implement
There remain a number of these other elements, some discussed
in the article by Lakdawalla et al. [4], that analysts in concept could
include in a CEA (or CBA) structure, but cannot meaningfully do
so because relevant data do not exist, and are impractical for
real-world analysts at present. Consider, as an example, a
vaccine against or the treatment of a virulent disease such as
Zika and Ebola or historical predecessors such as leprosy, tuber-
culosis, poliomyelitis, severe acute respiratory syndrome, and
AIDS. Public policy in these cases is often driven by issues such as
public fear of contagion that are not readily captured in
traditional CEA models. Such models normally do not include
the entire at-risk population and their disutility from the threat
of the disease. The missing element is the loss of utility
associated with the potential risk of exposure to the disease—
the “fear factor.” This fear has dominated public policy toward
these diseases for millennia, resulting in isolation colonies for
people with leprosy, quarantine rules for tuberculosis, travel bans
during severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemics, and many
other similar actions. An associated issue is the utility gained
from permanently eliminating the disease, raising a further
important issue—namely, aggregating costs and beneﬁts across
future generations of the population.
An additional array of potential value elements fall into this
general category of “conceptually feasible but generally imprac-
tical” for use in CEA or CBA without further research and testing.
This includes, for example, things such as ﬁt with existing
infrastructure/programs; availability of requisite trained person-
nel; improvement in children’s school participation and highest
grade attainment (and hence future earnings); ethical consider-
ations (e.g., involving end-of-life alternatives or manipulation of
genetic material); and—for an individual patient—fears associ-
ated with speciﬁc types of therapies (e.g., radiation and genetic
modiﬁcation). It also includes other elements discussed in the
article by Lakdawalla et al. [4]. In what follows, we discuss
methods that could be used to include both these less tractable
and the more traditional value elements in a consolidated
valuation.
Extended Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
In principle, one can conceive of estimating or eliciting from
individuals the total willingness to pay (WTP) for a deﬁned
bundle of attributes. In practice, this is often difﬁcult to do
because some key elements (e.g., the WTP for scientiﬁc spillovers,
for elimination of fear, for added clinical certainty, or for less
inequality) remain unknown. Absent this perfect solution, some
authors have proposed strategies for aggregating a few key
elements of value into a systematic framework.
An approach that also captures important aspects of equity,
albeit not within a fully aggregated value measure, is ECEA [5].
ECEA aims to describe the value of medical interventions and
policies along three speciﬁc dimensions: health gains, ﬁnancial
risk protection, and social cost, thus extending beyond the tradi-
tional CEA measures of health gains and costs. As a further
reﬁnement (separate from gathering information about these
added dimensions of value), ECEA collects this information for
different subpopulations of interest, thus allowing consideration
of distribution of beneﬁts and costs (equity and fairness). Finan-
cial risk protection reﬂects the reduction in the risk of ﬁnancial
distress due to health care costs, or the ﬁnancial costs of poor
health. It represents a subset of the “insurance value” concept
discussed in the article by Lakdawalla et al. [4]. Cost is measured
from the perspective of the society as a whole, as is common in
CEA. One could envision including additional measures of value,
but ECEA consists of these three. Equity reﬂects the value of
promoting a more just distribution of access to health care or
health outcomes themselves or conversely, the loss arising from
expanding inequality.
ECEA evaluates the distributional effects of a medical inter-
vention by specifying a set of population subgroups of interest.
For instance, one might evaluate groups that vary by income,
education, baseline health, disease status, or some other charac-
teristics of interest. By subgroup, ECEA then reports the health
gains, private expenditures avoided, and ﬁnancial risk protection.
Health gains can be measured using QALYs or other suitable
units. Private expenditures avoided reﬂect the reduction in
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out-of-pocket spending by subgroup. Theoretically, this includes
the totality of effects on private spending, including changes in
non–health-related spending. Financial risk protection is measured
as expenditures avoided suitably scaled by an individual’s income.
The concept is that a given level of avoided expenditures has value
in proportion to a person’s or household’s income or assets.
Concerning the concept of risk protection, to substitute for the
conceptually desirable “risk premium,” various metrics are pos-
sible, including expenditures averted as a fraction of income; the
change in the share of individuals above a certain threshold of
health care spending as a fraction of income; change in the
number of individuals with disposable income falling below
poverty thresholds; the WTP for the reduction in expenditures
faced in a given health state, in the context of a speciﬁc consumer
utility function; and so on.
The purest measure from standard welfare economics analy-
sis would be the Pratt-Arrow risk premium, that is, the product of
the absolute risk-aversion measure (r) and 0.5 times the variance
of remaining out-of-pocket expenditures [6,7], both of which are
difﬁcult to measure or even approximate at the individual level.
Garber and Phelps [8] reference the corporate ﬁnance literature to
estimate r* ¼ −r* income between 1 and 4. New work [9] using
labor supply data puts the value of r* slightly below 1, and rules
out values greater than 2. Variances are difﬁcult to estimate even
with large data sets in health care because of the large coef-
ﬁcients of skewness and kurtosis in medical expenditure data,
and the requirement of having data representing expenditure
distributions for people with similar or identical insurance cover-
age and health risks. Much can be written about each of these
approaches, but the common feature is some measure of expen-
ditures avoided, relative to the individual’s willingness to bear
ﬁnancial burden. None of these alternatives measure perfectly
the aspect of risk that is captured by variance in ﬁnancial outlays
and embedded in the standard risk-aversion measure.
ECEA then reports these three measures of beneﬁt by sub-
group and then scaled by the total cost of the intervention. Thus,
one might report total cases of poverty averted per dollar of total
cost, or dollars of ﬁnancial risk protection per dollar of total cost.
These measures are analogous to the more conventional cost-
effectiveness ratio of health gains (e.g., QALYs gained) per dollar
of cost, but there is no standard measure of WTP for these that is
equivalent to a cutoff value for cost per QALY or other CEA
investment rule.
Furthermore, ECEA provides little guidance on how to choose
a single metric to combine these elements of value. Indeed, the
absence of a single unifying economic framework for ECEA makes
this a matter of judgment rather than analysis. Although some
may view the multidimensional nature of ECEA as advantageous,
others may view it as a limitation, because ECEA offers no
obvious way to compare dimensions such as ﬁnancial risk
protection and health gains. Nonetheless, ECEA adds an impor-
tant tool to the literature on health care value, particularly for
analysts who care about and wish to quantify issues relating to
equity and risk, and it may provide a useful stepping stone to
more complete approaches that we discuss in a later section.
Augmented Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Going beyond the three dimensions of utility chosen in ECEA, one
could consider adding still more measures of value in addition to
health gains, social costs, and ﬁnancial risk protection. To differ-
entiate this from ECEA, we describe this approach as an ACEA,
emphasizing the extra dimensions of utility captured beyond
health gains, costs, and ﬁnancial risk. These added elements of
value might include (as examples, recognizing the risk of poten-
tial double counting) the value of physical risk protection,
scientiﬁc spillovers, the value of reducing diagnostic uncertainty
for patients, option value, ﬁnancial insurance value, the value of
preventing incurable diseases (such as polio, Ebola, or Zika), or
the value of completely eliminating a contagious disease from
the earth (as with smallpox, and nearly so with polio).
There are several potential approaches to including these
added elements. One is to create a separate set of element-
by-element comparisons, perhaps by subgroup if relevant.
Nevertheless, this approach—as with ECEA—would still make it
impossible to rank one intervention above another except in
cases of pure dominance (one is better than the other on all
measures of value), and that becomes increasingly unlikely as
more and more elements of value are added to the model. A
second approach is to selectively, and systematically, add ele-
ments to either the numerator (net cost) or the denominator (net
beneﬁt as measured in QALYs or utility) as most appropriate. This
approach has the advantage of retaining a cost-per-outcome ratio
form, but is likely to affect what threshold is applicable. A third
approach is to monetize all beneﬁts so that a net monetary
beneﬁt can be calculated. Nevertheless, many health policy
analysts and their clients ﬁnd the step of monetizing health
and related beneﬁts objectionable. Indeed, that very objection led
to the adoption of CEA over the previously developed CBA to
valuing health-related investments. Net monetary beneﬁt accom-
plishes the aggregation across different dimensions of value by
using the same potentially objectionable step of monetizing each
type of beneﬁt. A fourth approach solves this problem by provid-
ing a way to aggregate the multiple elements of value into a
single, nonmonetary metric—the topic we consider next.
Multicriteria Decision Analysis
Neither ECEA nor ACEA provides a single measure of value,
because they cannot fully aggregate across the various dimen-
sions of value that they describe. One approach does provide
such aggregation: MCDA, building on the work of Keeney et al.
[10], Saaty [11], von Winterfeldt and Edwards [12], and Barron and
Edwards [13]. In general, these approaches elicit from the “deci-
sion maker” the trade-off values to incorporate issues that cannot
or have not been included in CEA or CBA. Thus, these models
provide a uniﬁed one-dimensional measure of value of alterna-
tive choices using a multi-attribute metric that combines the
preference weights speciﬁed by the decision maker and the
performance of alternative “candidates” along each of the dimen-
sions of value. Although other approaches exist, the two most
common MCDA methods used in health care are the analytic
hierarchy process (AHP) and the multi-attribute utility theory
(MAUT). In the simplest form (linear MAUT), the value score is a
weighted linear sum of each candidate’s performance along each
relevant dimension. More complex models use multiplicative
models. The largest differences between these approaches
appear in the processes used to elicit the decision makers’ value
structures.
The key components of these MCDA models are the value
weights supplied by the decision maker(s) and measures of
performance of each intervention candidate along each speciﬁed
criterion. In effect, MCDA models attempt to re-create a system-
atic “utility function” of the decision maker that formally
expresses trade-offs between attributes of medical interventions
that create value—“goods” in the usual economic sense. Never-
theless, rather than estimating them from observed behavior, as
economists might normally do, they seek to elicit the trade-offs
through various structured processes. These weights will likely
differ considerably across different stakeholders (e.g., provider,
payers, or patients) and may well differ even within any of these
groups.
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MCDA models have a series of speciﬁc advantages compared
with less formal processes [14]. In particular, using formal MCDA
models
1. makes the decision-making process more transparent;
2. guides investment in data improvement (to where it most
affects decisions);
3. allows a “test drive” of alternative program speciﬁcations in
multidimensional value space;
4. allows “reverse engineering” to improve product speciﬁcations;
5. bypasses many cognitive errors made in intuitive human
judgments; and
6. may assist in decision convergence for divergent interests.
To be clear, we believe that speciﬁc value measures (such as
QALYs) are necessary core elements in any broader MCDA model
of value in health care. In some cases, these elements may
dominate the model, whereas in other decision contexts, other
attributes of the choices may assume greater importance (larger
weights). We view MCDA primarily as a method to expand upon
the elements and dimensions of value that are not readily
captured in CEAs. The most obvious “omitted element” concerns
issues of distribution (otherwise known as “fairness,” “equity,” or
“disparities”). Other important elements may enter these models,
particularly when they are difﬁcult or impossible to capture in
traditional CEA models. Some of these issues were discussed in
greater detail earlier in the ﬁrst section.
MCDA models readily allow analysts to use different perspec-
tives while using the same basic model, merely by changing the
dimensions of value (criteria or attributes) that are included in
the model and the weights they receive in the value structure.
Consider ﬁve of the potential perspectives outlined in the article
by Garrison et al. [2]: the public (societal), providers (doctors,
hospitals, etc.), payers (insurers), patients, and producers (those
who create and produce medical drugs and devices). Each might
choose different dimensions of value, or could share some, but
with different weights. Others with more deﬁned self-interests
(providers, producers, and payers) would likely have differing
perspectives [14].
Different stakeholders may well have different perspectives
(and hence weights) in an MCDA, but the proper use of two
perspectives seems clear to us. First, MCDA models should
always be presented—at a minimum—using a societal or payer
perspective for the same reasons that the societal or payer
perspective should always be presented as one option in CEA
models. In a speciﬁc example, health plans (either public or
private) should use a societal or payer perspective in determining
coverage of medical interventions (what is covered and at what
cost to the patient) and reimbursement to providers. But addi-
tional (separate) perspectives can also be developed within the
same MCDA structure.
Second, once a health plan determines coverage and reim-
bursement, a separate viewpoint may be useful—that of the
individual patient. Here, MCDA models using individual patient-
speciﬁc value weights could help patients choose among avail-
able medical interventions—those chosen for coverage by their
health plan—using both their own value weights and their out-
of-pocket costs. Such formal models might help patients choose
among complex alternatives such as alternative chemotherapies
for cancer, surgical versus medical intervention for some disor-
ders, or various strategies for mental illnesses. And in creating
MCDA-to-cost ratios comparable with cost-effectiveness ratios in
CEA, a societal view and the patient view could readily use
different measures of cost.
MCDA models differ from ECEA models in two ways. First,
ECEA incorporates only a ﬁxed set of criteria beyond health gains
and social cost—the dimensions of protection against individual
risk and issues of distribution (equity). MCDA in concept could
incorporate not only these but also other dimensions of value for
decision makers. Second, and most distinctly, ECEA (and ACEA as
well) does not provide a basis for assessing trade-offs between
gains in these desirable criteria, whereas MCDA explicitly elicits
decision makers’ preferences and uses them to provide a one-
dimensional measure of value. From this perspective, ECEA and
ACEA can be seen as a subset of MCDA, but both lacking ﬂexibility
in the number of criteria included in the depiction of value as
well as a method for measuring trade-offs between desirable
criteria.
Another use of MCDA allows incorporation of things consid-
ered valuable to the decision maker but which cannot readily be
accommodated in standard CEA, as the ﬁrst section discusses
earlier. In MCDA, at least some of these can be incorporated using
subjective measures of how well each competing technology
performs on these other dimensions of value. For example, in a
vaccine program, one could state the “ﬁt” with existing vaccine
schedules on (say) a 0 to 10 scale, and incorporate that ﬁt
attribute with a chosen weight. In concept, one could incorporate
this in elaborate measures of the cost of introducing alternative
vaccine programs, but in practice, such detail may be impossible.
MCDA can capture other issues that remain beyond the
attainable data for a full CEA or ACEA model. Most of these fall
into the category of states of the world where we have no existing
utility measurements (and where analysts cannot reasonably
expect to acquire such measurements). Consider as an example
the “fear factor” from a highly dangerous and virulent disease
(such as Ebola or Zika). MCDA can incorporate subjective judg-
ments about the ability of technologies to avoid such fear (with
an appropriate weight included in the model) in lieu of attempt-
ing to measure population-level utilities when people are con-
fronted with varying degrees of risk from such diseases.
Nevertheless, such utilities, if available, could be included in an
ACEA model.
Existing MCDA models suffer from a number of curable
defects, which are detailed in the following subsection. Some of
these affect only AHP, whereas others affect only MAUT, the two
most commonly used measurement models in health care
decision support. We view none of these defects as “fatal,” and
urge continued research to address these issues to improve
MCDA performance and ease of use.
Budget-Setting and Resource Allocation with MCDA
MCDA models suffer from a remaining problem. They do not
currently provide a clear method for making “investment
choices,” for example, deciding which new technologies to add
to the health beneﬁt package. And, in general, they provide no
basis for guiding budget-setting itself, in contrast to CBA and CEA.
Consider ﬁrst the simplest rule of CBA: invest in or include all
projects in which the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio exceeds 1. In CEA, the
standard rule says to invest if the cost per health unit gained (e.g.,
QALY or DALY) is smaller than the decision makers’ predeter-
mined cutoff value (and, in parallel, reduce investments in
interventions with cost-effectiveness ratios exceeding the pre-
determined cutoff). The World Health Organization has recom-
mended using a decision cutoff of 1 to 3 times per capita gross
domestic product, although it has more recently been reviewing
alternative threshold estimation approaches [17]. In England, the
National Institute of Health and Care Excellence uses a cutoff of
₤20,000/ QALY, increasing to ₤30,000, and even to £50,000 in
special circumstances. Other alternative approaches lead to
lower or higher cutoff values (e.g., see Neumann et al. [18]).
CEA measures have and can be used to help resource alloca-
tion decisions without formally using a speciﬁc cutoff. The
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common use of “league tables” to help people understand where a
medical intervention or technology “ﬁts” in the general realm of
common use and practice can inform some decisions about
health technology use. In these settings, an implicit CEA cutoff
is used in lieu of an explicit measure. This approach, however,
tacitly assumes that existing interventions in common use have
passed an implicit or explicit cost-effectiveness test, which is not
necessarily true.
In the world of MCDA models, one approach to prioritize
investments assumes that an exogenously given investment
budget is available, and recommends investing in projects with
the highest multi-attribute utility score ﬁrst, and proceeding
down the list of available projects until the investment budget
is consumed [19]. But, as noted, this approach provides no
guidance as to how large the investment budget should be.
A recent International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
Outcomes Research Good Practice Task Force report on MCDA
addressed the problem of budget-setting (or the parallel problem
of how to recommend the best investments), discussing two
speciﬁc options. These approaches either 1) include “cost” in the
MCDA model with a speciﬁc (negative) weight or 2) measure the
MCDA value of interventions thought to be susceptible to being
removed from use [20]. The Task Force concluded that neither of
these approaches was wholly satisfactory, and recommended
further research.
To be clear, we recommend that MCDA models do not include
costs as a (negative) attribute. As noted, using cost as an attribute
was one of the approaches considered in the earlier Task Force
report assessing MCDA. That report concluded (and we agree)
that using costs as an MCDA attribute implies knowledge of the
appropriate WTP for the value bundle, yet the MCDA framework
provides no basis for making such judgments [20]. Instead, users
of MCDA models should treat them as a comprehensive beneﬁt
(value) measure, independent of cost. Then (as we discuss
shortly) research must develop the best methods to determine
the investment budget or an acceptable threshold of MCDA
value-to-cost ratio to guide investment decisions.
One new approach has subsequently been suggested [16]. This
approach builds upon the availability of a WTP decision cutoff in
a CEA context (such as $100,000/QALY) and provides potential
guidance for MCDA models that contain QALYs as an important
attribute of value. In brief, this approach scales the CEA “cutoff
value” WTP for a QALY upward to account for other dimensions
of value not measured in the CEA framework. Thus, for example,
if QALYs accounted for two-thirds of the weight (or value) in an
MCDA model, and the WTP for a QALY CEA cutoff value was
$100,000/QALY, then the MCDA value-tocost cutoff would be 3/2
times the WTP for a QALY value CEA cutoff, or (in this example)
$150,000 per unit of MCDA value. In effect, agreed-upon values for
a WTP for a QALY CEA cutoff (such as may exist) serve as a
numeraire to estimate the total value of the expanded multi-
criteria value index. By analogy, it would be like adding new
safety features to automobiles and then re-evaluating them
taking the new features into account. The overall WTP for any
automobile should expand with new safety features added, but
the rankings of value would shift depending on how much new
safety enhancement was built into any particular model, and
each vehicle would then be ranked on the ratio of its new MCDA
value to its cost.
In some settings, a separate issue arises: nonalignment
between budgets allocated for provision of health services and
the decision rule to determine acceptability of medical interven-
tions. First, consider this issue in the familiar context of CEA. It
might arise, for example, when a prototypical “Minister of Health”
establishes the CEA cutoff, whereas a “Minister of Finance”
establishes the budget for the health care system. Even if initially
in balance, new technologies or health care interventions might
emerge that had an “acceptable” CEA cutoff, yet their inclusion
into the package of services offered to enrollees might greatly
exceed the budget. Drugs to treat hepatitis C appear to have
created this issue in some situations, and (for example) the
emergence of an effective treatment for Alzheimer's disease
could well cause it to appear in the future. This issue has
been described as the problem of “affordability.” In this situation,
the budget creates an implicit cost-effectiveness cutoff that is
more stringent than the ofﬁcial cutoff. Economists call this the
“shadow price.”
In the long run, the most desirable solution would bring the
budget-setting process and the CEA cutoff determination (or an
expanded MCDA cutoff determination) into alignment. The ofﬁ-
cial cutoff and the shadow price should be one and the same.
Achieving that alignment, however, may be difﬁcult to impos-
sible, at least in the short run. When a misalignment occurs, it
would appear that any of four logical solutions are available
(none exclusionary to the others): 1) increase the budget (Future
budget expansion may not be inevitable. One could imagine cases
in which a high expenditure for an intervention “today” reduced
subsequent-year budgets, e.g., through elimination of a conta-
gious disease or for reduced future liver transplant costs from
lower alcoholic cirrhosis. Proper intertemporal budgeting with
discounting would accommodate such issues, but politically set
budgets commonly do not have the appropriate temporal hori-
zon, and thus cannot accommodate such issues readily.);
2) tighten the ofﬁcial CEA (or MCDA) cutoff; 3) cut back on or
eliminate interventions with excessive CEA ratios (or in an MCDA
world, with poor MCDA value-to-cost ratios); or 4) as a variant on
point 2, estimate the shadow cutoff value implied by the budget
and use that as the “real” CEA (or MCDA) cutoff. In situations such
as these, resolving the lack of alignment between cutoff rules and
budgets must—at least in the short and intermediate run—
account for costs of change and other issues discussed previously
in the article by Danzon et al. [3].
This issue could become more prominent with the adoption of
MCDA value measures, particularly when they expand measures
of value beyond traditional health outcomes. This could place
more pressure on budgets than would arise in a pure CEA-driven
world. If the cutoff value should expand in MCDA models beyond
that used for CEA, then (other things equal) budgets will com-
monly have to expand to accommodate the costs of acquiring the
additional elements of value. Some of the added value (as
measured by the MCDA approach) may well lie outside the domain
of health, for example, elements of value arising in the domains of
education, social justice, or others. Budgets of health care pro-
viders or payers would not normally incorporate these “other”
issues, hence exacerbating nonalignment between budgets and
prespeciﬁed MCDA cutoffs. Offsetting these potential increases,
some existing interventions might fall in overall value as meas-
ured by the MCDA approach than previously ranked using only
CEA. In this situation, pruning out some interventions that score
poorly on the MCDA value-to-cost index could relieve budgets.
None of these solutions are easy to achieve in real-world
situations. In many cases, CEA ratios are not available for the
entire portfolio of existing interventions, and so deciding when to
“cut back” cannot rely entirely on using incremental CEA ratios.
This would happen even more frequently when an MCDA model
was used, if for no other reason than the more extensive data
demands of MCDA (beyond those of CEA) would make it less
likely that all interventions in the portfolio had been evaluated
using the appropriate metric. In situations such as these, the
most likely outcome is to turn to deliberative bodies to resolve
the dilemma, a topic to which we turn to next.
Another approach exists once an MCDA metric is chosen:
allow people to vote on the appropriate cutoff for the bundle of
beneﬁts as deﬁned by a particular MCDA weighting structure. In
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this setting, people would “vote” with a number for the cutoff
value to deﬁne an acceptable investment. For a number of
reasons, the median value is the most appropriate to use in such
a vote [21,22]. The same approach, of course, could be used
directly to choose a CEA cutoff through population voting.
Deliberative Processes
A deliberative process is characterized by the careful, deliberate
consideration and discussion of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of various options [23]. Hence, a deliberative process is best
considered as an aid to thought and judgment. Properly executed,
it will be—compared with an ad hoc process—more comprehen-
sive in the relevant issues embraced, more consistent in the way
they are embraced, and more engaging of the people affected by
the outcome. In making health care resource allocation decisions,
deliberative processes have been useful in incorporating wider
dimensions of value, for example, 1) social and cultural values,
such as other types of outcome beyond health gain; 2) other
social and personal values not typically taken into account, such
as issues of equity and fairness; and 3) practical issues of opera-
tional feasibility [24].
Currently, we have identiﬁed several examples of deliberative
processes in regular use. For example, the method used by the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence for evaluating
health care technologies in England and Wales includes formal
submissions from interested parties as well as consultations and
invited commentaries from consultees and commentators, sys-
tematic reviews, technical modeling exercises, and multiparty
representation in the (large) deliberative committee that hears
witnesses [25]. Rawlins and Culyer [26] and Rawlins et al. [27]
discuss how this process has been used to incorporate several
social judgments, including equity considerations, into decisions
of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence.
Also, the Scottish Medicines Commission uses several “modi-
ﬁers” in appraising new medicines, which are sometimes used to
justify accepting a higher cost per QALY (see the article by
Danzon et al. [3]). In Australia, George et al. [28] argue that the
Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Advisory Committee has taken account
of factors other than cost effectiveness in reaching its reimburse-
ment decisions, including severity of disease, the absence of any
other effective therapy, and the ﬁnancial burden on the patient if
the therapy was not reimbursed. Examples of bodies in the
United States that use deliberative processes to incorporate other
considerations when formulating policy recommendations are
the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [29] and the
US Preventive Services Task Force [30].
Although the evidence is not strong, the possible advantages
of deliberative processes are as follows: 1) decision makers
acquire a better grasp of the strengths and weaknesses of the
underlying cases and can better defend their decisions; 2) con-
sensus building is enhanced; 3) the revelation of evidence gaps
helps to inform downstream research programs; 4) stakeholders
and their peers are more likely to accept and implement deci-
sions that they have had a hand in shaping; 5) possible selection
bias through the membership of decision-making panels
becomes relatively more obvious; and 6) context-free evidence
can be re-interpreted in relevant contexts [24]. Daniels and Sabin
[31] argued that the reasonableness or legitimacy of the process
was crucial to obtaining acceptance of certain health plan
decisions. It can be argued that a transparent deliberative process
can increase the legitimacy of decision making compared with a
black box process in which it is unclear what has been considered
and how the decision was reached.
Nevertheless, deliberative processes may be relatively infor-
mal and unstructured. Thus, without a formal set of prompts, key
issues may be overlooked, decisions may be reached in an
unstandardized way, and the biases of decision makers may
not be adequately contested. There may also be a lack of
quantiﬁcation of elements other than health system costs and
health gain, which might in principle be taken into account. For
these reasons, it may be valuable to deliberative bodies to
incorporate an explicit framework such as MCDA. Some HTA
bodies or analysts, such as the Institute for Clinical and Economic
Review in the United States, have used this approach. As in all
such uses, MCDA analyses do not make decisions. Rather, they
inform the process and help quantify thinking Box 1.
If a deliberative process were to use MCDA to help structure
its decisions, then that deliberative body must set the weights for
the MCDA model in advance. Otherwise, the MCDA model has no
meaning in the context of the deliberation. Whether used to
augment deliberative processes or as stand-alone processes,
using MCDA models in the context of group decision making
requires voting or ranking procedures for groups to choose
among alternatives. Box 2 contains a brief discussion of some
pertinent issues for these “choice-related” procedures.
Deliberative processes, no matter what voting methods are
used, have participants integrating a considerable amount of
possibly complex information to reach a single conclusion. As is
now increasingly understood in the ﬁeld of behavioral econom-
ics, human decision making is often distorted by how questions
are framed, by inaccurate assessment of probabilities, and by
other important human fallibilities [36]. The formal structure of
MCDAmay avoid at least some of these issues that may persist in
less structured deliberative processes.
Other Value Elicitation Methods
The previous section discussed the use of MCDA models to
aggregate multiple dimensions of value into a single metric. The
commonly used models such as MAUT and AHP have speciﬁc
methods embodied in them to elicit the needed value trade-offs—
primarily arising from the work of people in the ﬁeld of decision
science. These methods have their own strengths and weaknesses
(as discussed earlier), but other approaches may prove fruitful,
some of which arise from the methods of economics.
Because health itself cannot be bought and sold in a market
setting, and because health care markets are distorted by insur-
ance or government subsidies, direct valuation of a health
intervention or a health insurance product as a differentiated
good through observed market prices—as economists might
normally do—is difﬁcult. In a recent article, Basu and Sullivan
[37] discussed the rationale of using stated preference methods
for developing “hedonic” value frameworks for health insurance
products to inform the decision on whether a product should
be covered or subsidized by insurance, given its price. They
propose that discrete choice experiments in a nationally repre-
sentative sample be used to elicit WTP for health insurance
products that would cover a new health intervention with
speciﬁc attributes. These elicitations should be carried out among
the patients who are the direct beneﬁciaries of this intervention
as they are diagnosed with the speciﬁc clinical condition as well
as the healthy individuals who do not have that speciﬁc clinical
condition but face varying risks of being diagnosed with that
condition in a given year. This combination of values from both
patients and nonpatients would reﬂect the true value of a health
care intervention because it would incorporate the value of
health insurance covering that intervention [38]. On the basis of
these elicitations, a WTP value index could be developed relating
to each of the dimensions of a health care intervention.
This value index will not reﬂect marginal value at market
equilibrium, as would appear in hedonic pricing estimates, but it
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would capture the distribution of marginal value in the popula-
tion. This approach can inform two speciﬁc decision-making
processes: 1) whether a health insurance budget could be
expanded to cover a new technology and 2) which existing
technology can be displaced to accommodate the new technology
that maximizes value in the health plan population. If either or
both cannot accommodate the budget impact of the new tech-
nology, then coverage may not be feasible. Basu and Sullivan [37]
lay out a research agenda that can help develop this concept of
hedonic valuation for health care value frameworks.
Conclusions and Recommendations
No existing method completely or perfectly solves the two
aggregation problems that we consider in this section. It is widely
understood that CEA, CBA, and related models cannot deal with
aggregation across individuals (equity, fairness, disparities, etc.)
and, in actual practice (if not in concept), cannot incorporate
some important components of value (and occasionally compo-
nents of cost). Consensus-building approaches (i.e., deliberative
methods) are often unstructured, idiosyncratic, and easy for
individuals to inﬂuence or control through agenda manipulation,
power of status, or personality. ECEA and even further expan-
sions of such models (such as ACEA) gather information about
additional outcomes beyond those considered in standard CEA,
but provide no mechanism for aggregating across the relevant
elements or dimensions of value. They provide uncontestable
answers to questions about coverage of an intervention only
when pure dominance emerges, that is, one candidate exceeds
another on every possible dimension of value. Thus, these are not
satisfactory methods to carry into the future without further
effort to improve upon them.
Public and private insurers use deliberative decision making
for payer coverage and reimbursement decisions. A transparent
deliberative process can increase the legitimacy of decision
making. Currently, such processes often lack transparency, and
it is unclear what factors have been considered and how decisions
were reached. Deliberative processes today are often informal and
unstructured. Thus, without a standardized approach, key issues
may be overlooked, decisions may be reached in an unstandar-
dized way, and potential biases of decision makers may not be
Box 1–Aggregation via MCDA and Deliberative Processes: Limitations and Approaches
Limitations to Current MCDA Models
The methods of value elicitation in MCDA differ from model to model. Standard AHP processes ask “the decision maker” to
evaluate all attributes in pairwise fashion, asking (a) which is more important and then (b) on a scale of 1-9 (typically) how much
more important is the better attribute. The number of questions needed to elicit the weights rises quadratically with the number
of dimensions of value; for N dimensions, there are N*(N-1) questions that must be answered. In group decision-making
processes, simple voting rules are normally used to elicit the “group value” structure. The problems from this approach are well
known. Most importantly, this independent pairwise evaluation process admits inconsistencies in the ﬁnal value structure, which
must either be ignored or resolved through re-evaluation. Second, the process for converting the data to usable weights relies on
mathematical methods that are difﬁcult for most people to understand, and hence create a sort of “black box”methodology. And
ﬁnally, at least some forms of AHP are subject to rank reversal (the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives issue), although
some variants of AHP avoid this issue.
Other approaches resolve some of these issues, but at the expense of creating other concerns. A standard approach sets
boundary values for the highest and lowest levels of utility created in single dimensions and then elicits “swing weights” to
capture relative value of each attribute, known as the Simple Multi-Attribute Rating Tool using Swings ( SMARTS) [13]. This
model and variants are widely used in MAUT. An easier reﬁnement elicits the value structure by simply asking “the decision
maker” to list the attributes in rank order, and then creates a set of weights that give the average of all possible weights
consistent with the rank order. This approach (known as SMARTER) has been shown to closely approximate the results using
exact measures of value rather than these simple approximations [15]. But this process brings its own difﬁculties. Most
importantly, this MAUT approach requires that “the decision maker” specify for each attribute a lower bound (the amount of the
attribute that creates zero added utility) and an upper bound (the amount of the attribute that creates maximum utility). This
approach violates the standard economic concept that “more is always better” by setting an upper bound on utility. More
importantly, these “boundary” values create a metric to measure performance of each candidate on each dimension of value,
typically scaled to 0-1 or 0-100, and the value weights interact with the “measuring stick.” Thus if the MAUT software’s
“measuring stick” metrics differ from those held in the minds of “the decision maker,” the results do not represent what the
decision maker intended. More detailed discussions of these issues are available [13,16].
Box 2–The Choice of Formal Voting Methods
Both the use of MCDAmodels and formal deliberative methods require that groups agree on choices. For example, AHP requires
a series of N*(N-1) pairwise votes to choose the more important of each possible pair of N value dimensions, and then another
vote to specify the relative importance (ranging from 1 to 9 typically). MAUT using the SMARTER process requires that the group
agree on a rank-order listing of the importance of the N value dimensions [13]. Multiple voting techniques are available to
accomplish these tasks, and they (not uncommonly) give different answers from the same group of voters.
Formal deliberative processes also require group agreement to choose among alternatives. When three or more choices exist,
no ranking method exists that meets four simple criteria [32] and all available voting methods to choose among three or more
choices are subject to strategic voting manipulation [33,34]. Even if the choices are reduced to pairwise comparisons using some
structured technique as Roberts’ Rules of Order, the opportunity for strategic manipulation of the outcome through agenda
control looms in many settings [35]. While we have no particular recommendation about choice of voting rules, we believe that
groups undertaking such votes either with MCDA models or deliberative processes should carefully consider the voting methods
they adopt and understand the potential consequences for their choices. A large literature on social choice theory (too large to
reference here) can help guide these choices.
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adequately explored. This can be improved, both by the introduc-
tion of cost-per-QALY evidence and by the use of more structured
decision making to take account of preferences about the weight
to be given to health gain—for example, about disease severity,
equity of access, or unmet need. A systematic comparison of the
processes used by various private and public pharmacy and
therapeutic committees and HTA programs may further help
others determine best practices for their own setting.
MCDA models may provide the best opportunity for improve-
ment, but they have not yet been perfected. To improve these
methods, we urge progress on two fronts. First, we must expand
the use of MCDA models in real-life decision settings and learn
from these experiences how well they work. We may learn that
they seldom differ from standard CEA in the investment advice
they give, or we may learn that formally incorporating these
“other issues” importantly changes many decisions. We cannot
know until we “run the experiment.”
Second, we also need more research on key aspects of MCDA
modeling and use. Just as the current “criterion standard” of CEA
did not begin in its current form, we can expect that MCDA will
evolve for the better in the future. In CEA, both for lack of the
proper conceptual framework and for lack of data, earlier efforts
focused on things that were easily measurable. These ﬁrst
included “deaths averted” or similar measures, and soon expanded
to “life-years saved” or similar measures. Then came the notion of
quality adjustment, leading to the current metric of the QALY
based on work that relies on population-based estimates of
reported quality adjustments for different health-related condi-
tions. A similar but not identical measure—DALY—is used by the
World Health Organization, the World Bank, and others: for this
measure, expert judgment has been used (at least initially) rather
than population survey data to create the adjustment factors [17],
although DALY estimates increasingly turn to population-based
metrics when available. A third related measure is the capabilities-
adjusted life-year, using a capabilities index instead of a health
state utility, initially proposed by Amartya Sen, progressed by
Nussbaum [39], and operationalized by Anand et al. [40].
We likely stand at a similar point in the evolution of MCDA
models with important issues to resolve before they reach their
full potential. Some have issues in ease of use. Some have
methodological ﬂaws such as the risk of “rank reversal” as new
technology options emerge. Little is known about important
human factor issues associated with the use of various MCDA
models, including ease of use, susceptibility to strategic manipu-
lation, and ease of comprehension of the methods (and hence
acceptance of the results). And ﬁnally, these approaches are quite
data-intensive compared with CEA modeling because they require
measuring each candidate technology on multiple dimensions of
value rather than on the single dimension of QALYs.
We recommend greater testing and use of MCDA models,
pushing the frontiers of their use and continuously comparing
their results with those of standard CEA and similar models.
Using ECEA or even more broadly—ACEA—models may provide a
halfway-house step to MCDA by facilitating data acquisition and
reﬁnement. But ECEA provides no way to combine multiple
dimensions of value into a single index of merit. MCDA provides
the logical basis for this next step. An important missing element
is a universally acceptable method to elicit value weights. Current
approaches have known defects (as discussed earlier), but have
nevertheless been demonstrated to assist in decision making in
complex health care settings, but further improvement is needed
to bring MCDA models to full ﬂower.
What are the best methods for acquiring value weights,
particularly in settings with groups acting as decision makers?
AHP and MAUT offer different approaches with different
strengths and weaknesses. Discrete choice experiments using
representative populations offer another approach to establishing
proper weights [37]. Other approaches may emerge as well. All
should be tested and compared both for methodological soundness
and for human factors (ease of use etc.).
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